There are many reasons why I think there is no chance that the prime minister will secure a significant change in the Irish defense mechanism, certainly not the kind of change with which its hard-core representatives in Brexiteer would be pleased.
The Cardinal among them is that many of these same representatives actually do not understand what the backstop is and where it originates.
Ireland's support is an emergency plan on what will happen if the United Kingdom and the EU can not find solutions for keeping the Irish border so open as it is now until the end of the transitional period; currently in December 2020.
This is the ultimate insurance policy for the Irish government, which has allowed Leu Varadkar, the Irish Prime Minister, to return to his parliament and to the voters and says he has not allowed the British to leave the EU while leaving Ireland and its border communities in a potential limbo.
While we were in this, many supported it in Northern Ireland; largely looking at it as the best means of preserving the Treaty on Great Friday – except, most importantly, for parliamentary partners Theresa May, DUP.
The security mechanism was created at the European Council summit in December 2017.
Ms. May agreed to this as a means of moving to the next round of Brexit talks.
Her wing Brexiteer barely sounded, obviously concerned about her logical implications for politics.
No government minister, including Boris Johnsons or David Davis, has resigned.
Instead they applauded their premier, which provided vital progress that many thought impossible and went to their happy Brexit way.
Nine months later, suddenly, they woke up and changed.
They realized that the result of such a protective mechanism, if no other arrangements could be achieved, would end with the "soft" Brexit by default, with the DUP claiming to separate the United Kingdom from Ulster.
This week they forced the prime minister to devote himself to withdrawing support from withdrawal agreements or radical changes.
Downing Street and some of the "hard" agents of Brexit claim that such changes might include; 1) one-sided exit clause for the United Kingdom; 2) time limit or; 3) Reduce feedback coupled with technological solutions.
That is why it seems that the understanding of a representative for that reason seems to depart from reality: either of them would neutralize a backward match, such as, for example, a backward match.
It would no longer be the insurance policy she designed it to be.
A one-sided exit clause gives no guarantees as Britain could leave it at will.
Imagine having an insurance policy where your insurer might choose to go away just when your house burns.
The time limit, unless it was exceptionally long (so it would not be enough to alleviate the politics in Brexite's eyes), would do the same.
And Iraq's doubts about the credibility of the technology solution were intricately linked to the creation of a protective mechanism.
The reason Irci asked for his creation was that they did not believe Britain would be able to come up with technology-based solutions, or otherwise, to the borderline in two years until the end of the transition period.
The idea that the government could lower it for two weeks seems far away.
No solution provided by Downing Street or Tory MPs therefore eliminates the need for protection.
Indeed, they confirm – in the minds of the Iraqis – why it was necessary at all.
That is why the EU is not progressing.
But maybe some of the European Research Groups (ERG) of Torojevic Eurosceptics all know this.
They are aware that Ireland and the EU can not give up, but their vote for Brady's amendment Tuesday night – which required replacement of security with "alternative arrangements" – allows them to say that they tried to negotiate and the EU is wrong that failed.
Downing Street probably knows it.
My estimate is that number 10 has agreed to try to make changes to buy two extra weeks and to lower the clock.
To make it as close as possible to March, to look at the white faces of Labor MPs – and urge them to vote again for a deal and risk failing to negotiate Brexit.
That is why, I suppose, Labor's sources at Jeremy Corby's office were surprised at how honestly inverted Mrs. May looked at their meeting on Wednesday afternoon.
She knows she will need her plan B.
Prime Minister, quietly, has a two-way strategy.
Because, finally, Mrs May certainly made her last card with her party.
Tuesday night he perfectly matched the cycle and rhythms of her premier leadership.
She is in trouble, promises change to buy time, can not deliver it, and promises something bigger to buy more time.
But every time, she is backing into a firmer and toughest corner captured in the wild sand of her own vows.
After all, that strategy shook the prime minister with protection first of all.
But there is nothing in the armory, nothing greater than what May might do, and the precious little sand remained in the sand watch.
That is how Brexit will eventually be reduced to a halt.
Will labourist representatives, terrified without agreement, go in enough to support Mrs May's plan?
Or maybe the laborers attract enough soft members of the Brexiteer Tory with their own ideas, something that might even remind you of the "Norwegian model"?
Mr Corby's high helper tried to point out that the official supplement of the Labor Opposition, which offered Brexit's milder, had 292 votes on Tuesday night.
Far more than the Prime Minister's plan just over two weeks ago.
They would not need a lot of soft Breyit supporters who would support it if it seemed that the government could not bring anything.
Can I offer such a deal – to give up hope in the general election, because they rightly believe that the mayor of May might divide and sink the conservative party itself?
In politics, you should never ask a question if you do not know the answer.
Looking for changes in the EU, the prime minister and ERG leaders have already done so.
But they could be cautious, for Mr. Corbyn and Laborers could have their own answers.